The Miranda rule requires police to inform a suspect that he has a right to silence and a right to have counsel with him while he is being interrogated. Failure to inform a suspect of his rights will result in any confession being inadmissible against him at trial.

But is compliance with the Miranda rule a Constitutional duty? Is it the U.S. Constitution which requires a police officer to advise a suspect of his rights? Is failure to give the Miranda warnings to a suspect before interrogating him a violation of his Constitutional rights? If you answered "yes" to any of these questions, you may be surprised to learn otherwise.

THE CASE BEGINS

On January 24, 1997, a man armed with a semi-automatic pistol and carrying a black leather bag burst into a bank in Alexandria, Virginia and robbed it of approximately $896.00. He ran out of the bank and down the street to a white Oldsmobile Ciera. He tossed something into the trunk and got into the car on the front passenger side. The car then sped away.

Witnesses had taken notice of the car and its license plate, and investigation soon disclosed that the car was registered to Charles T. Dickerson of Maryland. Three days later, FBI Special Agent Lawlor and other agents went to Dickerson's apartment. Although Dickerson would not allow the agents to search his apartment, he consented to go with them to the FBI field office.

DICKERSON'S CONFESSION

At the field office, Dickerson first denied any involvement in the bank robbery, but admitted that he had been in the vicinity of the bank on the date of the robbery. He had met a friend quite by chance and had driven him to a liquor store at his request.

While Dickerson was being questioned, Agent Lawlor acquired a telephonic warrant from a federal magistrate to search Dickerson's apartment. Dickerson finally admitted to being the getaway driver in a series of bank robberies. He admitted that the January 24th robbery had actually been committed by a Jimmy Rochester, but he (Dickerson) had been the driver of the getaway car. Dickerson was then arrested.

Dickerson was indicted by a federal grand jury on charges of conspiracy, bank robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of federal criminal statutes.

DICKERSON MOVES TO SUPPRESS

Before trial, Dickerson moved to suppress his confession on the grounds that he had not been read his Miranda rights before confessing.

At the suppression hearing, the evidence concerning Miranda warnings was disputed. Special Agent Lawlor testified that he had obtained the telephonic search warrant from the federal magistrate, and "shortly after" receiving it, gave Dickerson the Miranda advisement. Dickerson had then waived his rights and confessed.

Dickerson, on the other hand, testified that he was told the search warrant had been obtained, but he was not given the Miranda advisement until "about thirty minutes later". He said he confessed during this thirty minute period before being read and waiving his Miranda rights.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION

The judge at the suppression hearing was faced with the problem of determining the credibility of Special Agent Lawlor and Charles Dickerson. Who was telling the truth? Had Lawlor advised Dickerson of his Miranda rights before Dickerson confessed, or had he obtained Dickerson's confession and then advised him of his rights?

The judge felt that Dickerson's testimony was more worthy of belief and found that although Dickerson's confession had been voluntary, Lawlor had obtained it before advising him of his Miranda rights. Therefore, the judge suppressed, or threw out, the confession. [1]

The government appealed the district court's decision to the Fourth Federal Court of Appeals.

THE HEART OF THE MATTER

The court of appeals went immediately to the real problem in the case: in suppressing the confession, the federal court had failed to consider a federal statute which says that a confession (in a federal court) shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. This statute does not require that a suspect be given any warning or advice of rights. It requires only that the confession be voluntary. So the real problem, said the court of appeals, was whether the district court should have simply respected the statute and admitted the confession, even though it had been taken in violation of the Miranda rule!

BACK TO BASICS

Let's pause now in our thrilling narrative to review the basics of confessions:

The fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution says,

"...nor shall any person in a criminal case be compelled to be a witness against himself."

Absolutely nothing at all is said in the fifth amendment or anywhere else in the U.S. Constitution about warning or advising a suspect of this right.

Historically, confessions were admitted at trial without restrictions of any kind. Slowly, a rule evolved that confessions which had been extracted from a suspect by force or fear were not reliable and they should not be admitted in evidence. Only confessions which had been made voluntarily were reliable [2] and therefore admissible.

But sad to say, this rule of voluntariness was not always scrupulously honored by law enforcement authorities, and confessions were sometimes acquired by force, threats or coercion and admitted into evidence against the suspect.

The Miranda Decision

By the 1960s, instances of police misconduct in acquiring confessions had set the stage for the Miranda decision. An enlightened U.S. Supreme Court, encouraged by the awareness of an aroused and progressive public, believed the time had come to view the fifth amendment right against compelled statements through the prism of the 1960s civil rights movement.

In the Miranda case (384 U.S. 436 (1966)), the U.S. Supreme Court said, in effect, that a right was non-existent if an individual did not know that he had such a right. And since the only source of that knowledge, as a practical matter, would be the police at the time of the suspect's custodial interrogation, the Court ordered that any statement made by a suspect when subjected to custodial interrogation by law enforcement authorities must be preceded by their advice to him of rights.

The Court said any statement would be inadmissible unless the police advised the suspect

1. he had the right to remain silent.
2. any statement he made could and would be used in evidence against him.
3. he had a right to the presence of an attorney during questioning.
4. an attorney would be appointed for him at no expense to himself if he could not afford one.

To be sure, the requirement that the confession also be voluntary was not affected. A suspect may be advised of his so-called Miranda rights and he may exercise or waive those rights, but his confession must still also be voluntary.

This leads us to the next question: Is the warning of rights required by the constitution? And the answer is no!

The Miranda rule is a rule established by the Supreme Court to protect the right contained in the Fifth Amendment, but this warning of rights is not required by the U.S. Constitution.

The Omnibus Crime Control Act (Title 18 U.S.C.A. sec. 3501)

In 1968, only two years after the Miranda Decision, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control Act [3]. Section 3501(a) of that act states in part

"In any criminal prosecution [in federal court] a confession...shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given...but the trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession..."

It is clear that Congress enacted sec. 3501 with the express purpose of legislatively overruling Miranda and restoring voluntariness as the only test for admitting confessions in federal court. So the question is: which governs the admissibility of confessions in federal courts, the Miranda decision which requires advice of rights, or sec. 3501 of the Omnibus Act which does not require warning of rights but requires only voluntariness in the giving of the confession?

And the answer to that question depends on whether Congress possesses the authority to supersede a U.S. Supreme Court rule.

Although the Omnibus Act was passed by Congress in 1968, the Department of Justice refused to enforce it. The Department has gone so far as to say, on one or more occasion, that the statute is unconstitutional!